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INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, efforts in the United States and
Canada towards cannabis legalization raise significant
concerns about the conflict between federal regulation and
state/province autonomy. While both countries share
similar histories on the “war on drugs,2” the current political
arena in each country is advancing diverging positions on
the issues of cannabis prohibition and legalization at the
federal level. 3 Since 2013 the Canadian Liberal Party
continues to provide compressive revisions to the
legalization of cannabis. 4 Such efforts have seen a
remarkable expansion under the present leadership of Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau. Cannabis legalization in the United
States witnessed somewhat of a similar progression under
President Obama’s term; however, President Trump’s tenure
and his cabinet leave an indeterminate future to legalization

Kara Godbehere Goodwin, Is the End of the War in Sight?: An Analysis of
Cana's Decriminalization of Marijuana and the Implications for the United
States "War on Drugs," 22 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 199, 201 (2003).
2

Contributor article, Canada Takes Next Step Towards National Marijuana
Legalization,
ENTREPRENEUR,
(Dec.
29,
2016),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/287046.
3

4

Id.

2017

A CALL TO HIGHER ACTION

445

and regulation of cannabis. 5 A possible regression in
cannabis legalization and regulation under President Trump
will place the legal cannabis industry and its consumers in a
precarious position. Steps towards cannabis legalization in
each country provoke questions about how such legalization
will affect the American-Canadian relationship, but more
importantly, how far will the U.S. allow for the state
legalization experiment to continue without federal action.
Likewise, the two countries experience different positions in
case-law regarding marijuana regulation, creating an
impressive conflict of laws in the Western Hemisphere.
Each country focuses on different standards of
enforcement and regulation regarding cannabis legalization;
for example, Canada prioritizes health policy and the a right
to security from criminal prosecution when attempting to
obtain medical treatment. 6 The experiment of legalizing
medical cannabis ameliorated a few issues the illicit market
imposed, as such, this became the move towards
experimenting on adult use to further mitigate persistent

Associated Press in Toronto, Canada’s New Liberal Government Repeats
Promise to Legalize Marijuana, GUARDIAN, (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/04/canada-new-liberalgovernment-legalize-marijuana
5

Carolynn Conron, Canada’s Medical Marijuana Regulations: Up in Smoke,
6 Albany Gov. L. Rev, 259, 267 (2013); Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)
6
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problems in banning cannabis. Response by the government
was backed by court decisions focusing on the security of the
individual from government intrusion. 7 Contrary to
Canada’s focus, much of the U.S. government’s case-law
remains silent on the issue of individual rights8 regarding
marijuana legalization; instead, policy is prescribed for
rigorous drug regulation and crime prevention. 9 Such
distinct approaches taken by Canada and the United States
makes it unclear how well the two countries will deal with a
potentially emerging global market for cannabis in the
future.10 Ending the state experiment through a harmonious
application of cannabis law in the U.S. can address the
uncertainty, while bringing substantial economic and social
benefits as evidenced by the states and Canada that have
addressed this issue. The lasting effects of silence will on
bring unpredictable repercussions that need addressing
through honest discussions about the impacts of the banning
cannabis between the two governments.
This Note examines how each country’s divergent
policies towards cannabis reform, suggests these neighbors

7

Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91 (27) (U.K.).

8

Goodwin, supra note 1 at 214; see also Conron, supra note 5 at 267.

9

Goodwin, supra note 1 at 215.

Will Yakowicz, Forget Colorado Weed, Marijuana Companies are Going
Global, Inc. (May 27, 2016), http://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/forgetindoor-weed-welcome-to-the-global-marijuana-market.html.

10
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deal with cannabis law in a similar way to prevent unknown
impacts of legalization in one country and partial
legalization in the other. Further, this note will examine how
recent changes in the politics of each nation will engender
more instability and conflict between the two, which need to
be addressed by highest levels of government. Part II of this
Note speaks to how the initial focus on the prohibition of
cannabis, in both the United States and Canada, was due to
discriminatory and nationalistic attitudes that were backed
by the respective governments. Part III examines the
prohibition effects vis-à-vis government action on cannabis
reform: in the United States this was subject to state
prerogatives, while, in Canada, the initiative was directly
taken by Parliament. Part IV analyzes the overwhelming
consequences created because of government indecision and
the lack of dialogue between both countries regarding
cannabis policy, whilst proposing solutions to those issues.
II.

HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES
A. THE GRINNO-WAY

The regulatory regime around cannabis policy in the
United States witnesses a continual inconsistent
development since the conception of the nation. Many
suggest the mêlée of cannabis prohibition was motivated by
misaligned judgments associating minorities with crime and

448
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violence. 11 Nevertheless, within the past decade, the
legalization of cannabis at the state level attempts to
ameliorate the sins of the past through comprehensive
regulation and enforcement of legal medicinal and/or
recreational marijuana. With an awareness of the potential
benefits that may bear fruit from legalization, states have
heeded the widespread approval by the American
populous: 12 the 2016 election concluded with 29 states
legalizing cannabis in some form. 13 However, the

See generally Martin D. Carcieri, Obama, the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the Drug War, 44 AKRON L. REV. 303, 325 (2011) (Recounting early
marijuana prohibition in U.S. as largely motivated by racism).

11

See generally Art Swift, Support for Legal Marijuana Use Up to 60% in US,
GALLUP.COM, (Oct 19, 2016) (demonstrating that about 60% of there the
populations favor legalization for either medical use or recreational use,
which is the highest data has shown in the 47-year tread),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/196550/support-legal-marijuana.aspx
12

See Sara G. Miller 3 More States Legalize Recreation Use of Marijuana: How
the
Map
Looks
Now,
LIVE
SCIENCE,
(Nov
9,
2016),
http://www.livescience.com/56807-recreational-marijuana-californiamassachusetts-nevada.html
Recreational use of marijuana is now
allowed, along with the District of Columbia, in Alaska, California,
Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.
While medical use of marijuana is now allowed in Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Vermont.
13
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contemporary trend towards cannabis legalization
highlights significant disparities between state and federal
laws. Additionally, one may wonder where the trajectory of
the future of federal marijuana legalization may progress
with the Trump Administration and Senator Jeff Sessions as
Attorney General—a known challenger of cannabis
legalization.14 Issues of federalism, coupled with the election
of a republican majority government, may put the
progression of cannabis legalization in limbo or regress,
which could conceivably hinder U.S. relations with a
promising legal market in neighboring Canada, if federal
inaction ensues.
1. THE BEGINNING YEARS
The inception of cannabis prohibition in the United States
began no more than a century ago. During the colonization
of the free nation, the consumption, production, and sale of

See Christopher Ingraham, Trump’s pick for attorney general: ‘Good people
don’t
smoke
marijuana’,
Wash.
Post,
(Nov
18
2016)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/18/tru
mps-pick-for-attorney-general-good-people-dont-smokemarijuana/?utm_term=.b77ea1288eac (“At a Senate drug hearing in
April, Sessions said that “we need grown-ups in charge in Washington
to say marijuana is not the kind of thing that ought to be legalized, it
ought not to be minimized, that it’s in fact a very real danger.” He voiced
concern over statistics showing more drivers were testing positive for
THC, the active component in marijuana, in certain states”).
14

450

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 24

cannabis was legal due to a high reliance on hemp at the
time. 15 By the close of the nineteenth century, cannabis
became, alongside tobacco and cotton, one of the leading
crops produced in the Americas. 16 During this time,
physicians often prescribed cannabis for medical treatment;17
however, after a rise in opiate addiction following the Civil
War, cannabis fell under the same fate as many other
commonly persecuted drugs, such as heroin and cocaine.18
Moreover, much of the early restrictions on cannabis are
documented as being under the guise of federal drug
regulatory objectives backed with discriminatory sentiments,

RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, THE MARIJUANA
CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED
STATES 51–53 (1974); See also PATRICK ANDERSON, HIGH IN AMERICA 47
(1981).

15

STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAS:
RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS, xv (1993)

16

STEVEN W. BENDER, RUN FOR THE BORDER: VICE AND VIRTUE IN USMEXICO BORDER CROSSINGS (2012)
17

See generally DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE
WAR ON DRUGS 70, 71 (2007)
18
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which were immensely supported by states until recently.19
Scholars suggest that xenophobic and racist opinions
inundated early cannabis prohibition due to an influx of
Mexican and Chinese immigrants into the states.20
At the turn of the twentieth century, the use of cannabis
was frequently and mistakenly associated with minority
groups and crime, especially in Latino and Black
communities.21 Although active legislation was put in place
to combat addiction, none made mention of a direct cannabis

Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the
Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 707, 749–51
(1998) (“In 1937, Harry J. Anslinger was serving as the United States
Commissioner of Narcotics . . . . Anslinger's appeal to racism and
hysteria was unabashed. He and other proponents of the Marijuana Tax
Act argued that marijuana caused criminal and violent behavior . . .
Anslinger stated that, ‘[m]arihuana [was] an addictive drug which
produce[d] in its users’ insanity, criminality, and death’”).
19

See generally PROVINE, supra note 17 at 70 -71; Carcieri, supra note at 10
at 325.
20

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE,
MARIHUANA: A
SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 16 (1972)
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=
mdp.39015015647558;view=1up;seq=5.
21
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prohibition 22 until Congress set out to regulate marijuana
through a tax. 23 Initial federal prohibition was backed by
sentiments displayed, for example, in the polemic film,
Reefer Madness (1936),24 “which depicted marijuana users as
murderous fiends.” 25 Prohibitionist and Federal Narcotics
Bureau Commissioner, Harry J. Anslinger, used the film as
an exemplar of how cannabis was the “assassin of the

Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, Ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (requiring
registration and special tax to produce or dispense opium or coca leaves
or their derivatives but gives no mention about similar procedures for
marijuana); see also LISA N. SACCO & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43164, STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION INITIATIVES:
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
FEDERAL
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
3
(2013),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43164.pdf (“Until 1937, the
growth and use of marijuana was legal under federal law. The federal
government unofficially banned marijuana under the Marihuana Tax Act
of 1937”).
22

Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 81-82 (2015).
23

Nick Wing, Marijuana Prohibition was Racist from The Start. Not Much
Has Changed, Huffington Post, (Jan 14, 2014) (discussing Reefer Madness
and Government discriminatory tactics in marijuana prohibition),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/14/marijuana-prohibitionracist_n_4590190.html.

24

25.

See Steven W. Bender, Joint Reform?: The Interplay of State, Federal, and
Hemispheric Regulation of Recreational Marijuana and the Failed War on
Drugs,
6
ALB.
GOV'T
L.
REV.
359,
363
(2013).
http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/116.
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youth,” inducing violent behavior and repercussion more
destructive than any other drug. 26 The vilification of
cannabis permitted Congressional introduction of the
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, “bann[ing] the unlicensed and
non-medicinal use” of cannabis. 27 The American Medical
Association (AMA), vigorously opposed marijuana’s drop
from the Federal Pharmacopeia, contending that the use of
cannabis could be useful for medicinal purposes, and that
there was no legitimate evidence demonstrating cannabis to
provoke criminal conduct.28
Notwithstanding
credible
opposition,
Congress
approved the Act and reclassified cannabis as a controlled
substance.29 Though the Act did not declare cannabis per se
illegal, the cumbersome imposition of the tax on

ISAAC CAMPOS, HOME GROWN: MARIJUANA AND THE ORIGINS OF
MEXICO’S WAR ON DRUGS 19 (2012) (describing Anslinger’s article
'Marihuana: Assassin of Youth” attributing more than two dozen cases
relating to murder or sex attacks because of marijuana, and how in later
years Anslinger retreated from claims and emphasized the supposed role
of marijuana as a gateway drug).

26

27

BENDER, supra note 16, at 97.

See ANDERSON supra note 14 at 8; see also LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B.
BAKALAR, MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE (1997).
28

29

See Chemerinsky, supra note 22 at 82.
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administrative and regulatory measures made it impossible
for any legitimate involvement in the cannabis industry.30
2. FEDERAL PROHIBITION
Official illegality of cannabis began through the
enactment of the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) in 1970,
providing the “statutory framework through which the
federal government regulates the lawful production,
possession, and distribution of controlled substances.”31 By
criminalizing cannabis, the purposes of the CSA was to
“combat drug abuse, prevent the diversion of drugs from
legitimate to illicit channels, and eliminate ‘[t]he illegal
importation, manufacture, distribution, possession, and
improper use of controlled substances.’” 32 A multitude of
substances are placed by the CSA in five distinct schedules
based on each substance’s medical use, potential for abuse,

JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN
DO ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 25 (2d ed.
2012); see also BENDER, supra note 16 at 202.
30

21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012); see also TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42398 MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 2 (2012).
31

David Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of
Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 577 (2013) (citing
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
10 (2005)).
32
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and liability on safety or dependency. 33 Under the notion
that cannabis has “no currently accepted medical use” and
“high potential for abuse,” Congress listed cannabis as a
Schedule 1 drug, which is the most restrictive category. 34
Effectively, this made the cultivation, distribution, or
possession of cannabis a federal crime. 35 Serving as a
standard for various state laws, the CSA brought a new era
of cannabis reform, and, within a few years of its passing,
cannabis was criminalized in all fifty states.36 Nevertheless,
due to cannabis’s availability in black markets and the
racially
disproportionate
enforcement
of
laws,
37
reconsideration of the ban became a state focus. States

33

Garvey, supra note 30 at 2.

34

Id.

35

Id.

Chemerinsky, supra note 22 at 84 (discussing after passing CSA, states
began to implementing law prohibited marijuana prompted state law as
the basis for marijuana arrests).
36

Id. at 84-85; see also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON
MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE: BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WASTED ON
RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 8 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/criminal-lawreform/war-marijuana-black-and-white-report (reporting a “Black
person is 3.73 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession
than a white person, even though Blacks and whites use marijuana at
similar rates.” These racial disparities still exist in today and in most
regions of the United States).
37
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began to embrace popular advocacy for not only the
disparate criminalization between minorities and whites, but
also commenced reexamining cannabis use with respect to
the potential medicinal benefits.38

B. THE CANADIAN WAY
1. EARLY DEVELOPMENT THANKS TO OPIATES
Cannabis in Canada endured a similar fate of
inconsistent methodologies to combat cannabis use as it had
in the United States. Just like its southern neighbor, initial
cultivation of cannabis in Canada predominately served the
hemp industry, and its use was for medicinal treatment.39
Likewise, Canada’s history is equally plagued with
discriminatory and nationalistic ideologies in an effort to
combat the war on drugs. 40 The use of Chinese migrant
workers for railroad construction and gold mining was as

38

Schwartz, supra note 32 at 577.

39

Goodwin, supra note 1 at 204.

40

Id.
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prevalent in Canada as it was in the United States, and both
countries dealt with the opiate addiction allegedly to be
brought by the Chinese. 41 Completion of many of these
projects by Canadian companies lead to the unnecessary
need for Chinese labor, resulting in thousands of these
workers being left homeless and thereby creating a serious
immigration crisis.42 In its attempt to control the crisis, the
Canadian government enacted the Opium Narcotic Act of
1908,43 prohibiting the import, manufacture and sale of nonmedicinal opiates.44
Although the Act was designed by the Canadian
government to “eliminate an undesired element of the labor
pool,” the Chinese, the Act became the basis for all
governmental dealings with illicit drugs.45 However, issues
of enforcement emerged and the development of Chinese
opium smuggling networks prompted the government to

See generally THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF CANNABIS IN CANADA, HACK
CANADA
(Jan.
26,
1999),
http://www.hackcanada.com/canadian/freedom/hempinfodoc2.html;
see also Kyle Grayson, CHASING DRAGONS: SECURITY, IDENTITY, AND
ILLICIT DRUGS IN CANADA, 132-133 (2008).
41

42

Id.

43

The Opium and Narcotic Drug Act, S.C. 1923, c. 22 (Can.).

44

Id.

45

Id.; Goodwin, supra note 1 at 205.
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revitalize the Act of 1908 into the Opium and Drug Act,
which was promulgated in 1911. Not only did this new Act
cover opiates, but it also caused the government to extend
the list to other prohibited drugs. 46 Furthermore, an
amplification of minority criminalization for drug
possession and use in the states prompted comparable
approaches in Canada, further supported by MacLean’s
Magazine, which published a series of articles regarding
illicit drugs in Canada. 47 Analogous to the American
demonization of cannabis use in association with minority
groups and crime, these articles written by Judge Emily
Murphy professed a white only Canada by claiming:
“Addicts to this drug, while under its
influence, are immune to pain, and could be
severely injured without having any
realization of their condition. While in this
condition they become raving maniacs, and are
liable to kill or indulge in any form of violence
to other persons, using the most savage
methods of cruelty without ... any sense of
moral responsibility. When coming from under
the influence of this narcotic, these victims
present
the
most
horrible
condition
imaginable. They are dispossessed of their
natural and normal will power, and their

46

Id.

47

Id.; Hack, supra note 42.
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mentality is that of idiots. If this drug is
indulged to any great extent, it ends in the
untimely death of its addict.”48
Murphy’s stance on cannabis prohibition derives from
discriminatory sentiments akin to those made by Harry J.
Anslinger, claiming cannabis as a “menace to society,”
causing minorities to act violently and insanely, particularly
Mexicans. 49 These articles, later compiled into a book
entitled “The Black Candle,” were used by prohibitionists
“for the express purpose of arousing public demand for
stricter drug legislation.”50 Murphy’s contentions potentially
incited the Canadian government to extend the Opium and
Drug Act to include cannabis as a prohibited drug in 1923.51
2. CONTEMPORARY PROHIBITION
Canadian use of cannabis escalated in the 1960s and
1970s, inciting an increase in drug convictions and arrests

EMILY F. MURPHY, THE BLACK CANDLE 332-33 (1922); Grayson, supra
note 42 at 148.
48

49

MURPHY, supra note 49 at 333.

50

Hack, supra note 42.

51

Id.
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throughout the country.52 In 1972, talks of a liberalization of
Canadian drug policy, notwithstanding the persistent
negative stigma of cannabis, prompted the creation of the
Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs,
also referred to as the Le Dain Commission. 53 The
Commission recommended a repeal of the cannabis ban
based on extensive research findings that “the social cost . . .
did not justify the nation’s current drug policies.” 54
However, like the AMA’s recommendations to Congress,
negative perceptions of cannabis use encouraged the
government to discount the assertions to reclassify cannabis

R. Solomon et al., Legal Considerations in Canadian Cannabis Policy, 4
CAN. PUB. POL’Y 419, 421 (1983).
52

53

Hack, supra note 42.

See generally Canadian Government Commission of Inquiry into the
Non-Medical Use of Drugs. "Conclusions and Recommendations of
Gerald Le Dain, Heinz Lehmann, J. Peter Stein" (Recommending outright
legalization or fines for marijuana use)
54

2017

A CALL TO HIGHER ACTION

461

under the Narcotic Control Act.55 Aside from an amendment
to the Act allowing prosecutors to proceed with cases under
lesser offenses, the Le Dain Commission provoked the
formation of the Non-Medical Use of Drugs Directorate
(NMUDD). 56 This pivoted the focus to health policy
considerations rather than criminal sanctions.57
Pressures from the Reagan Administration on global
drug policy caused the enactment of Canada’s Drug Strategy
in 1987 in order to enforce, treat, and prevent drug use.58
However, the program failed once funding ended, and, in
1997, the government enacted the Controlled Drugs and

55 See

generally Canadian Government Commission of Inquiry into the
Non-Medical Use of Drugs. "Conclusions and Recommendations of
Marie-Andree Bertrand (“The federal government should remove
cannabis from the Narcotic Control Act, as the Commission
recommended in its Interim Report. The federal government should
immediately initiate discussions with the provincial governments to
have the sale and use of cannabis placed under controls similar to those
governing the sale and use of alcohol, including legal prohibition of
unauthorized distribution and analogous age restrictions. Furthermore,
this government-distributed cannabis should be marketed at a quality
and price that would make the 'black market' sale of the drug an
impractical enterprise”).
56

Goodwin, supra note 1 at 207.

57

Id.

58

Id.
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Substance Act (“CSDA”), replacing the Narcotic Control
Act.59 Cannabis escaped classification as a Schedule I drug,
like cocaine and heroin, and instead was classified as a
Schedule II drug, where penalties for possession,
distribution, and production were lessened; particularly for
personal use. Defining any substances “that can alter
consciousness as a controlled substance,” the CSDA brought
to Canada the American-driven strategies towards the “war
on drugs,” which were later found to be as unworkable as in
the states, and ultimately calling for provincial and federal
government intrusion. 60 Dispute active regulation and
enforcement, cannabis use and distribution increased
significantly, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) reported that “marijuana production activities will
continue to increase” because of the popular use among
individuals and prevalence of black markets making
cannabis available.61
While the government continued to assert the dangers of
cannabis use, advocates against the ban pushed for reform of
cannabis policy, arguing that the basis of the draconian law

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (Can.) (creating a
focus in drug legislation back into the criminal system and changing
drug scheduling used by the Canadian government).

59

60

Goodwin, supra note 1 at 207.

See generally Drug Situation in Canada, ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED
POLICE CRIM. INTEL. PROGRAM. (April 2002), http://www.rcmpgrc.gc.ca/crimint/drugs_200 1e.htm.
61
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was “idiotic, unfounded, and inaccurate.” 62 Advocates
claimed the government maintained the prohibition of
cannabis by the dissemination of propaganda and the use of
medical studies that were outdated and discredited by the
scientific community.” 63 Particularly, these advocates
denounced the American influence on the war on drugs in
Canada, calling for Canadian independence on the matter,
hopeful that eventual cannabis reform in Canada “would
put tremendous pressure on U.S. lawmakers to do the
same.” 64 Realizing these conflicting methodologies
continued to be undermined by black market and popular
opinion regarding legalization, Canada moved to
significantly alter laws regarding medical marijuana access.
Presently, the government is considering full legalization of
recreational marijuana to alleviate these persistent problems.

See Isabel Vincent, Canada: Enforcers Challenge Cannabis Liberation
Movement, GLOBE & MAIL, (Apr 6, 1998),
http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v98.n255.a08.html/all.
62

63

Id.

Id. (Proponents of decriminalization say that Canadian legislators are
loath to reform cannabis policy because of pressure from the United
States . . . "We can't seem to get beyond the repressive American policy
on drugs," . . . strong influence of the U.S. government's so-called war on
drugs, which came to a head under the Republican administrations of
Ronald Reagan and George Bush in the 1970s and 1980s . . . So, we
maintain this cowardly insistence of being little foot soldiers to the
American war on drugs.")
64
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EFFECTS OF PROHIBITION AND THE ROAD TO
LEGALIZATION: A STORY OF DIFFERENT
APPROACHES

Since the passing of controlled substances acts, Canada
and the United States have instituted conflicting views in the
management of cannabis policy. What can be attributed to
these opposing approaches is the rise in progressive
movements in Canada at the start of the millennium, while a
rise of conservative inclinations prompted more enforcement
and control in the United States. 65 Furthermore, the
Canadian government’s progression of legalization focuses
on a balance between crime prevention and an individual’s
right to use cannabis for medicinal treatment, while the
American approach is silent on individual rights: crime and
drug prevention are at the forefront of federal policy.66 This
next section will outline the legalization process in each
country, as well as discuss the effects of the cannabis ban
throughout the process.
A. STATE DISOBEDIENCE AND MARIJUANA
POLICY’S PUZZLING FUTURE IN THE UNITED
STATES

Jeet Heer, Canadian Rhapsody, The Great White North’s Unlikely
Progressivism, BOSTON GLOBE, (July 13, 2003.)

65

66

Goodwin, supra note 1at 214-5.
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Notwithstanding the federal ban, since 1996 States
have implemented legislation allowing for the use,
production, and distribution of medical cannabis under the
view of the potential health and economic benefits.
Ironically, California, one of the first states to criminalize
cannabis, became the first state to legalize medical cannabis,
basing this decision on the political and popular support of
cannabis use for terminally-ill patients. 67 California’s
Proposition 215 became the longstanding model for reform
at the state level, with the condition that legal use of medical
cannabis is possible when recommended and prescribed by
a medical physician for treating a medical condition. 68
Presently, either through ballot initiative or state legislative
process, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia
have enacted laws modeled after the California initiative of
medical cannabis; eight states have legalized cannabis for
adult use.69
Moreover, certain provisions in state medical and
recreational cannabis laws are designed to shield
individuals, doctors, and others in the industry from state

67

Chemerinsky, supra note 22 at 85.

68

Garvey, supra note 30 at 4.

Melia Robinson, the legal weed market is growing as fast as broadband
internet in the 2000s, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Jan.
3,
2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/arcview-north-america-marijuanaindustry-revenue-2016-2017-1.

69
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criminal prosecution.70 States where recreational marijuana
is permitted “impose state controls akin to the more
restrictive state laws regulating the sale of alcoholic
beverages.” 71 However, while State legalization of both
medical and recreational cannabis are in force, this violates
the Federal CSA ban on marijuana. 72 With other states
following suit73, constitutional questions linger regarding the
constraints on the relationship of federal and state law, and
whether the conflict will foster instability and ambiguity in
“states that are pioneering new approaches to marijuana
control.” 74 The cannabis markets in the United States and
Canada are growing at an extraordinary rate; it is purported
that the market will surpass the gains of the dot-com era by

70

Schwartz, supra note 32 at 575.

71

Id.

72

21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012).

Seerat Chabba, Marijuana Legalization 2017: Which States Will Consider
Cannabis This Year?, INT’L BUSINESS TIMES, (Dec. 31, 2016)
http://www.ibtimes.com/marijuana-legalization-2017-which-stateswill-consider-cannabis-year-2467970 (discussing state legalization in
2017, with Delaware, Rhode Island, Vermont and New Mexico moving
to recreational use of marijuana, and other states such as New Jersey,
Texas, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri).
73

74

See Chemerinsky, supra note 22 at 77.
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a projected growth of 25% per year. 75 This exploding market
calls for federal reassessment of potential initiatives to
establish a legitimate market in the U.S.
1. FEDERAL INDECISION BECOMES AN ON/OFF
SWITCH
As states move for legalization of cannabis, either for
medical or recreational use, discrepancies in federal and
state law places the use, production, and distribution of
marijuana in a dual state of compliance and violation. 76
Marijuana policy in the United States witnessed an acute
progression under President Barack Obama, chartering an
end to the Bush administration’s frequent raids of medical
marijuana distributors and the inconsistent application of

Robinson, supra note 69; See also Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Sales Total
$6.7 Billion in 2016, FORBES, (Jan 1, 2017) (“To put this in perspective, this
industry growth is larger and faster than even the dot-com era. During
that time, GDP grew at a blistering pace of 22%. Thirty percent is an
astounding number especially when you consider that the industry is in
early stages. ArcView’s new editor-in-chief Tom Adams said, "The only
consumer industry categories I've seen reach $5 billion in annual
spending and then post anything like 25% compound annual growth in
the next five years are cable television (19%) in the 1990's and the
broadband
internet
(29%)
in
the
2000's’”)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/01/03/marijuanasales-totaled-6-7-billion-in-2016/#1c0352e18716.
75

76

21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012).
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federal and state law. 77 In an informal policy, President
Obama announced that the federal government has “bigger
fishes to fry,” and the focus on drug enforcement should be
geared towards the black market and not the legitimate state
market.78 Likewise, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden
in 2009 issued a memorandum providing guidance and
clarification regarding federal prosecution in states that have
legalized medical marijuana. 79 The memorandum

See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Obama Administration to Stop Raids
on Medical Marijuana Dispensers, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar 18, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 03/19/us/19holder.html; see also Stu
Woo & Justin Scheck, California Marijuana Dispensaries Cheer U.S. Shift on
Raids,
WALL
S T.
J.,
(Mar.
9,
2009)
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123656023550966719.

77

See Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let
Washington, Colorado Marijuana Laws Go into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST,
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/ericholder-marijuana-washington-colorado-doj-n 3837034.html.
78

See generally Memorandum from David W. Ogden, U.S. Deputy Att’y
Gen., to U.S. Att’ys (2009) (“does not “legalize” marijuana or provide a
legal defense to a violation of federal law, nor is it intended to create any
privileges, benefits, or rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by
any individual, party or witness in any administrative, civil, or criminal
matter. Nor does clear and unambiguous compliance with state law or
the absence of one or all of the above factors create a legal defense to a
violation
of
the
Controlled
Substances
Act”)
https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-unitedstate-attorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states.
79
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specifically declares the “pursuit of [federal] priorities
should not focus federal resources in [ . . . ] States on
individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous
compliance with existing state laws providing for the
medical use of marijuana.” The memorandum, although
useful for some clarification on compliance, nevertheless,
leaves states in limbo because there is nothing precluding a
federal “investigation or prosecution even where there is
clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law . .
. where investigation or prosecution otherwise serves
important federal interest.” 80 Even with such cautionary
language, the post-memorandum effect demonstrated an
optimistic future for a “hands-off policy to enforcing federal
marijuana laws in states authorizing marijuana under state
law.”81
However, an upsurge in the “commercial cultivation,
sale distribution, and use of marijuana for purported
medical purpose” provoked a Department Of Justice
(“DOJ”) response in a 2009 memorandum by Deputy
Attorney General James M. Cole. 82 Responding to state

80

Id. at 3.

81

See Chemerinsky, supra note 22 at 87.

See generally Memorandum from James M. Cole, U.S. Deputy Att’y
Gen.,
to
U.S.
Att’ys
(June
29,
2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/
dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf.
82
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authorization “of large-scale, privately operated industrial
marijuana cultivations centers,” the Cole Memorandum
clarified the scope of the Ogden memorandum, declaring the
government “never intended to shield such actives from
federal enforcement action and prosecution, even where
those activities purport to comply with state law.” 83
Therefore, those “who are in the business of cultivating,
selling, or distributing marijuana, and those who knowingly
facilitate such activities, are in violation of the [CSA]
regardless of state law.” 84 Since the issuing of the
memorandum, state and federal prosecution of those
involved in the marijuana industry skyrocketed, causing
many states to hold off on legislation expanding their

83

Id.

See Sarah Kliff, Justice Dept. Won't Stop States from Legalizing Pot. Here 's
What
That
Means,
WASH.
POST,
(Aug.
29,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog
/wp/20
13/08/29/justice-dept-wont-stop-states-from-legalizing-pot-heres-whatthat-means/.
84
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medical marijuana programs or programs for recreational
use.85
Deputy Attorney Cole provided a subsequent
memorandum responding to the passing of recreational
marijuana laws by Colorado and Washington, announcing a
waiver on legal challenges to recreational laws, but reserving
the right to interfere with criminal prosecution actions [i]f
state enforcement efforts are not sufficiently robust.” 86
Interference from the federal government would ensue
should the states fail to comply with eight outlined

See Medical Marijuana: Federal Crackdown, Similar to That in California,
Begins in Colorado, HUFFPOST DENVER (Jan. 12, 2012, 4:28 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/12/
medical-marijuanafederal_n_1202725.html; See also Bob Ponting, Feds Raid Medical
Marijuana Facilities, FOX 5 SAN DIEGO (Apr. 23, 2013, 9:28 PM)
http://fox5sandiego.com/2013/04/23/feds-raid-medical-marijuanafacilities/ #axzz2YkLqhqUS; Colleen Slevin & Kristen Wyatt, Denver Pot
Businesses Raided Ahead of Legal Sales, YAHOO (Nov. 21, 2013, 6:21
PM),
http://news.yahoo.com/denver-pot-businesses-raided-aheadlegal-sales-232109833.html (discussing November 2013 raids of Colorado
marijuana dispensaries).
85

See Memorandum from James M. Cole, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen., to all
U.S.
Att’ys
(Aug.
29,
2013)
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.
pdf.
86
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priorities, 87 or if state laws were implemented that would
otherwise “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”88
These communications by the federal government provide
minimal guidance regarding state law compliance, leaving
undefined road towards the solution of marijuana’s dual
status in this federalism conflict. Recently, the federal
government refused to reschedule marijuana under the CSA
in 2016 with the perception that marijuana contains no

Id. at 1-2 (Preventing distribution of marijuana to minors; Preventing
revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises,
gangs, and cartels; Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states
where it is legal under state law in some form to other states; Preventing
state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext
for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity;
preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and
distribution of marijuana; Preventing drugged driving and the
exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences associated
with marijuana use; Preventing the growing of marijuana on public
lands and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed
by marijuana product on public lands; and Preventing marijuana
possession or use on federal property).
87

See County of San Diego v. San Diego Norml, 165 Cal. App. 4th 798 (2008)
(holding state law conflicts with the CSA only when it is impossible to
comply with both state and federal law).
88
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medicinal value.89 Aside from a few recent clarifications, the
federal government remains mute in the reclassification of
cannabis, the conceivable medical benefits of cannabis, and
the potential of outright legalization. 90 In a sense, the
government has failed in mitigating prevailing issues that
are a by-product of the cannabis ban.

2. FEDERALISM EFFECTS
The federalism anomaly poses a variety of
constitutional questions, which have received little to no

See DEA PUB. AFF., DEA Announces Actions Related to Marijuana and
Industrial
Hemp,
DEA.GOV
(Aug.
11,
2016),
https://www.dea.gov/divisions/hq/2016/hq081116.shtml (DEA has
denied two petitions to reschedule marijuana under the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA). In response to the petitions, DEA requested a
scientific and medical evaluation and scheduling recommendation from
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was
conducted by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
consultation with the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA). Based
on the legal standards in the CSA, marijuana remains a schedule I
controlled substance because it does not meet the criteria for currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, there is a lack of
accepted safety for its use under medical supervision, and it has a high
potential for abuse).
89

90

Id.
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answers regarding the marijuana state experiment.
However, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court
established the cultivation and production of medical
cannabis is well within Congressional Commerce
authority.91 Notably, the Court’s opinion in Raich dealt solely
with the question of Congress’ Commerce power to regulate
and prohibit “intrastate possession and use of marijuana;” it
did not comment on the question of whether state law
permitting the use of marijuana for medical purposes is
preempted by CSA. 92 The Court’s holding results in
incongruent state and federal laws, which furthers
indecision under the doctrines of preemption and anticommandeering.93
The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause establishes the
preemption doctrine by declaring federal law “the supreme
law of the land” and that the “fundamental principle of the
Constitution is that congress has the power to preempt state
law.”94 This bears the constitutional question whether state

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (Relying on the1942 decision of
Wickard v. Filburn, the Court held prior precedent “firmly establish[es]
Congress’[s] power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce”).

91

92
93

Garvey, supra note 30 at 6.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 22 at 102.

Id. at 102; see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372
(2000).
94
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law legalizing marijuana is preempted due to its direct
conflict with the CSA.95 Nonetheless, while a conflict exists,
the CSA does not entirely preempt state marijuana laws due
to the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering doctrine,
and a CSA provision clarifying that “Congress did not
intend to entirely occupy the regulatory filed concerning
controlled substances or wholly supplant traditional state
authority in the area.” 96 The anti-commandeering doctrine
institutes a federal restriction forcing state enforcement,
development, or maintenance of federal law. 97 Thus, the
federal government is precluded from commandeering
states to enact legislation on intrastate regulation regarding
an activity commonly regulated by the federal government.98
Likewise, it is impermissible for state executive officials to be
commandeered by the federal government for the purpose
of carrying out federal law.99 Furthermore, the preemptive

95

Chemerinsky, supra note 22 at 102.

96

Garvey, supra note 30 at 9.

97

Id.

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding congress
cannot commandeer the legislative process of the states no matter how
important federal interest is).

98

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933, 138 L. Ed. 2d 914, 117 S. Ct.
2365 (1997) (holding unconstitutional “commandeering” of state officers
is similar to a commandeering of legislature, which is outside of
congressional authority and violates the Tenth Amendment).
99
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power of the federal government is expressly limited in the
CSA unless “a positive conflict between” state and federal
laws makes it either “physically impossible” to comply with
both laws, or the state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment
and
execution”
of
congressional
objectives.100
Although there are some consistencies in preemption
and anti-commandeering, scholars affirm remaining
ambiguities in the law that leave an opportunity for
preemption of the CSA, which may prevent state protection
of citizens complying with state law.101 Even more straining
is the uncertain future of the federal stance on marijuana
after the election of a Republican-controlled government and
the appointment of Jeff Sessions as Attorney General, who

See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (“No provision of this subchapter shall be
construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy
the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties,
to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive
conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so
that the two cannot consistently stand together”).
100

101

Chemerinsky, supra note 22 at 102-13.
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has spent decades opposing legalization,.102 As more states
endorse legalization, the issue of preemption remains
undefined, and, until the Supreme Court or federal
government opines on the subject, states may experience
federal intervention, which may overrule state marijuana
initiatives.
The federalism conflict makes compliance with the
law uncertain. The CSA’s ban on marijuana makes it so
those involved in the marijuana industry cannot deposit
legitimate profits in banks and are finding themselves at risk
of theft by storing physical cash. 103 Pressure from the

See Jezreel Smith, Donald Trump and Republicans On the Legalization of
Marijuana; Is There A Possibility to Stop What Obama Started (“Democrats'
votes legalizing marijuana over having it illegal is 66% vs. 33% whereas
for republicans almost 55% oppose marijuana legalization while 41%
favoring it); see also Patrick McGreevy, Weed’s Legal in California, But
Activist Fear a Battle Ahead with Jeff Sessions, Trump’s Pick For Attorney
General, (“Sessions said at a legislative hearing in April that ‘good people
don’t smoke marijuana’… He went on to say, “We need grown-ups in
charge in Washington to say marijuana is not the kind of thing that
ought to be legalized”).
102

Jacob Sullum, Eric Holder Promises to Reassure Banks About Taking
Marijuana Money ‘Very Soon,’ FORBES (Jan. 24, 2014, 1:02 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2014/01/24/eric-holderpromises-to-reassure-banks-about-taking-marijuana-money-very-soon
(“Huge amounts of cash, substantial amounts of cash just kind of lying
around with no place for it to be appropriately deposited, is something
that would worry me”).
103
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government results in banks shunning marijuana producers
out of fear of federal prosecution for money laundering.104
Lack of uniformity, or even federal guidance, makes it
impossible for the marijuana businesses operating through
cash only to be regulated or taxed, particularly

Memorandum from James M. Cole, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen., to all U.S.
Att’ys,
(Feb.
14,
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/co/news/2014/feb/DAG%20Memo%20%20Guidance%20Regarding%20Marijuana%20Related%20Financial%20
Crimes%202%2014%2014.pdf
(“Financial
transactions
involving
proceeds generated by marijuana-related conduct can form the basis for
prosecution under the money laundering statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and
1957), the unlicensed money transmitter statute (18 U.S.C. § 1960), and
the BSA. Sections 1956 and 1957 of Title 18 make it a criminal offense to
engage in certain financial and monetary transactions with the proceeds
of a “specified unlawful activity,” including proceeds from marijuanarelated violations of the CSA. Transactions by or through a money
transmitting business involving funds “derived from” marijuana-related
conduct can also serve as a predicate for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §
1960. Additionally, financial institutions that conduct transactions with
money generated by marijuana-related conduct could face criminal
liability under the BSA for … failing to identify or report financial
transactions that involved the proceeds of marijuana-related violations of
the CSA. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)”); Serge F. Kovaleski, Banks Say No
to Marijuana Money, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/us/banks-say-no-to- marijuanamoney-legal-or-not.html.
104
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in states that have legalized recreational use of
marijuana. 105 Until there is a federal prescription guiding
states with these issues, the federal ban on marijuana will
remain defamatory to the current legal industry, making it
impossible for banks and others engaged in commercial
practices to perceive marijuana as a legitimate industry.106
Additionally, business in the legal marijuana industry or
people simply seeking legal advice are encountering
inconsistent state regulations in accessing attorneys. The
federal ban, coupled with the most recent DOJ
memorandum, marks participation or knowledge of legal
marijuana commerce as a breach of the CSA; therefore,
attorneys providing such services may find themselves
conceivably violating ethical codes of the state bar and
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. 107 States like

Govs. Hickenlooper, Inslee Call for Flexibility in Federal Banking
Regulations for Marijuana Businesses, COLORADO: THE OFFICIAL STATE
WEB
PORTAL
(Oct.
2,
2013),
http://www.
colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?c=Page&childpagename=GovHickenlooper%
2FCBONLayout&cid=12 51646488031&pagename=CBONWrapper; see
also Chemerinsky, supra note 22 at 92.
105

106

Chemerinsky, supra note 22 at 93.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (d) (2015) (“A lawyer shall
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the
legal consequences of a proposed course of conduct with a client and
may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law”).
107
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Arizona, Colorado, and Washington have a relaxed by
cautionary approach, expressing a need for attorneys to keep
in mind of the federal prohibition when advising clients as
well as stating no intention of attorney discipline by the bar
for those “who in good faith advice or assist clients . . . in
strict compliance with the state and its implementing
regulation[s].” 108 Maine and Connecticut have ambiguous
approaches, stating “the Rule governing attorney conduct,
does not make a distinction between crimes that are
enforced and those that are nonetheless a federal crime.”109
Complications presented by federalism and government
inaction, especially to the access of attorneys and banking,
are added exacerbations to the uncertainty of the future of
the legal marijuana industry.

COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, RULE 1.2 OF REPRESENTATION AND
ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER, Amended
and Adopted by the Court, En Banc (March 24, 2014)
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/court_Probation/Suprem
e_Court/Rule_Changes/2014/2014%. 2805%29%20redlined.pdf.; WASH.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, RULE 1.2 OF REPRESENTATION AND
ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER.
108

Opinion #199. Advising Clients Concerning Maine’s Medical
Marijuana
Act
(July
7,
2010)
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=1
10134; Informal Opinion 2013-02: Providing Legal Services to Clients
Seeking Licenses Under the Connecticut Medical Marijuana Law, (Jan. 16,
2013),
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/ctbar.siteym.com/resource/resmgr/Ethics_
Opinions/Informal_Opinion_2013- 02.pdf.
109
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OF MEDICAL
FUTURE
OF

The legalization initiative in Canada is principally a
federal
government
response
to
disproportionate
criminalization of those who need marijuana for medical
treatment and the security of individual rights. Canada’s
progression toward medical marijuana legalization, and now
recreational legalization, focuses primarily on a government
promotion of health issues, individual rights, and the control
of organized crime groups. 110 Contrary to the American
legalization process, which focuses on regulation and
enforcement of drugs based on criminal prosecution, the
Canadian government continues to experiment with
marijuana legalization. This section will outline the basis for
change in Canada under section 7 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms111 and the government response to increasing
barriers for individuals to obtain medical marijuana. The
section will conclude with the future of marijuana
legalization in Canada proposed to be due by the Canadian
Task Force in 2018.

United States-Canada Border Drug Threat Assessment - Response to
the Situation, NAT'L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER (Dec. 2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs07/794/794p.pdf at 31.
110

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
111
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1. SUPREMACY OF SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER:
THE BASIS FOR CHANGE
Revisions to legalization in Canada stem from Section
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, the supreme
law of Canada that declares any law contrary to the charter
void.112 Under the Charter, “[e]very person has the right to
life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.”113 These independent but intersecting
rights under Section 7 apply to all natural citizens of Canada
and can be asserted in the presence of government intrusion
into these rights.114 During the 1990s and early 2000s, the
government initiated considerations of access where
guaranteed rights became the basis for reconsideration of
medical marijuana access. In 1999, the “Research Plan for
Marijuana for Medicinal Purposes” announced by Health
Canada stipulated a research plan to understand medicinal
marijuana’s viability, and thereafter established the
Marihuana Medical Access Program (MMAP).115 The MMAP
amended section 56 of CDSA to allow access to marijuana

The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11, Part I § 7; see also The Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 Part IV § 52 (
112

113

Id.

114

Conron, supra note 5 267.

115

Id.
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for medical purposes but required the issuance of an
exemption under the CDSA. 116 Because of the negative
stigma of marijuana, many doctors were reluctant to
prescribe marijuana, and people found it nearly impossible
to obtain the medical exemption, causing them to turn to the
black market and risking criminal prosecution.117
Moreover,
increasing
criminal
prosecution
inaugurated legal challenges to the CDSA, where courts
began to consider the proportionality of criminal
prosecution for possession and cultivation of medical
marijuana alongside the individual’s right to security.118 In
2000, the Ontario Court of Appeal issued an opinion to
Section 56 of the CDSA in R. v. Parker, where defendant
Parker, growing his own supply of marijuana to avoid the
black market was arrested for possession and cultivation of
cannabis. 119 The Ontario Court found “[t]he government’s
failure to provide reasonable access for medical purposes
violated Mr. Parker’s rights under Section 7 of the Charter, as

See Marihuana for Medical Purpose Regulations, Regulatory Impact
Analysis
Statement,
CAN.
GAZETTE,
(Dec.
15,
2012),
http://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2012/2012-12-15/html/reg4-eng.html
[hereinafter Analysis Statement].
116

117

Conron, supra note 5 at 276.

118

Id.; see also R. v. Parker, [2000] 49 O.R. 3d 481, 5 (Can. Ont. C.A.).

119

Parker, [2000] 39 O.R. 3d at ¶ 13.
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he had not only been charged with a criminal offense but
was forced to choose between his ‘liberty’ and his
‘health.’”120 The Court concluded the objectives of the CDSA
were to protect the health of citizens, but, by preventing
access to cannabis, the objectives were running counter to
the legislative effect; the court therefore concluded the
CDSA arbitrarily denied “a generally safe medical treatment
that might be of clear benefit” as inconsistent with
guarantees of the charter and fundamental justice.121 Citing
the holding of R. v. Morgentaler, the court affirmed the
“‘[s]ecurity of the person’ within the meaning of Section 7 of
the Charter must include a right of access to medical
treatment for a condition representing a danger to life or
health without fear of criminal sanction.”122 The Court held a
blanket prohibition on cannabis possession in the CDSA,
with no legal source to supply medical marijuana, deprives

The Canadian Bar Association, Bill C-2, Respect for Communities Act,
NAT’L
CRIM.
JUSTICE
SECTION,
1,
3
(2014)
https://www.cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=97319f43-237d4ff4-9fe6-a0a7341ec0e0.
120

Id,; Parker, [2000] 39 O.R. 3d at ¶ 109, 139, 192 (“[T]he common-law
treatment of informed consent, the sanctity of life and commonly held
societal beliefs about medical treatment suggest that a broad criminal
prohibition that prevents access to necessary medicine is not consistent
with fundamental justice”).

121

Parker, [2000] 39 O.R. 3d at ¶ 93 (“‘state interference with bodily
integrity and serious state-imposed psychological stress, at least in the
criminal law context, constitute a breach of security of the person’”).
122
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individuals of the “right to security of the person and right
to liberty,” and is therefore unconstitutional under Section 7
of the Charter. 123 The Court’s holding inspired current
changes in marijuana policy by the government, and serves
as a blueprint for other courts in determining when
principles of fundamental justice interfere with criminal law
and disproportionally impede on the individual rights
guaranteed by the charter.124

123

Id. at ¶ 153.

Parker, [2000] 39 O.R. 3d at ¶ 117 (The principles of fundamental
justice are breached where the deprivation of the right in question does
little or nothing to enhance the state's interest[;] (ii) A blanket prohibition
will be considered arbitrary or unfair and thus in breach of the principles
of fundamental justice if it is unrelated to the state's interest in enacting
the prohibition, and if it lacks a foundation in the legal tradition and
societal beliefs that are said to be represented by the prohibition[;] (iii)
The absence of a clear legal standard may contribute to a violation of
fundamental justice[;] (iv) If a statutory defense contains so many
potential barriers to its own operation that the defense it creates will in
many circumstances be practically unavailable to persons who would
prima facie qualify for the defense, it will be found to violate the
principles of fundamental justice[; and] (v) An administrative structure
made up of unnecessary rules, which result in an additional risk to the
health of the person, is manifestly unfair and does not conform to the
principles of fundamental justice.); see also Canadian Bar, supra note 121
at 3-4.
124
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Subsequently, the Court’s holding prompted
governmental response to consistencies of the objectives and
effects of the CDSA. In 2001, the Canadian government
amended the CDSA to allow personal possession and
purchase of marijuana for legitimate medical needs and it
enacted the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations
(MMAR). 125 The Regulation “establish[ed] a framework to
allow access to marihuana by individuals suffering from
grave or debilitating illnesses;” those seeking medical access
must be authorized under one of the three categories of
symptoms and disease 126 and supported by medical
practitioners. 127 While this attempt by Health Canada

Marihuana Medical Access Regulations, SORI2001-227 § 1 (Can.)
[hereinafter MMAR].
125

MMAR, supra note 126 at §1(1) ("category 1 symptom" means a
symptom that is associated with a terminal illness or its medical
treatment. "category 2 symptom" means a symptom, other than a
category 1 symptom, that is set out in column 2 of the schedule and that
is associated with a medical condition set out in column 1 or its medical
treatment. "category 3 symptom" means a symptom, other than a
category 1 or 2 symptom, that is associated with a medical condition or
its medical treatment).
126

Id. at § 4(1) (2) (“(1) A person seeking an authorization to possess
dried marihuana for a medical purpose shall submit an application to the
Minister. (2) An application under subsection (1) shall contain (a) a
declaration of the applicant; (b) a medical declaration that is made (i) in
the case of an application based on a category 1 symptom, by the medical
practitioner of the applicant, or (ii) in the case of an application based on
a category 2 or 3 symptom, by a specialist”).
127
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offered access to medical marijuana to more individuals
without the fear of criminal sanction, the requirements in the
MMAR were deemed impossible for many to satisfy, and led
to inevitable debates in the Canadian courts.128
2. SERIES OF COURT DECISION AND
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Since the Parker holding, medical marijuana reform in
Canada has endured incremental modification from both
government response and Charter challenges to the effects of
government regulation that is contrary to the guarantees of
Section 7 .129 A series of cases continue to reshape marijuana
reform, and have prompted response from the current
federal government to legalize adult use of cannabis in order
to ease the effects of government regulation. Much of the
MMAR has been long debated for its ambiguity and silence
on pertinent implications of government regulation on
individual access and rights concerning the use medical
marijuana. A major challenges to the first MMAR was the
regulation’s burden in accessing legal supply to medical
marijuana, which demonstrated that even when one was
able to obtain a medical exemption, individuals were

128

Analysis Statement, supra note 117.

129

Conron, supra note 5 at 282.
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turning to illegal purchases for medical marijuana. 130 In
2003, the Ontario Court of Appeals in Hitzig v. Canada,
considered a MMAR challenge to the legal supply and
access of medical marijuana and determined legislative
restriction created a serious impediment for individual
access to a legal supply.131 The claimants attempted the near
impossible task of finding medical professionals that would
authorize their medical exemption. 132 Reviewing the
evidence, the Court held the MMAR directly violated rights
of liberty and security set by Section 7 of the Charter.133 The
Court’s holding reaffirms government implementation of
processes preventing authorized users to medical marijuana
as counter to the principles of fundamental justice because,
by removing legal access to supply, the government is

Id.; R. v. Krieger, [2000] 307 A.R. 349, ¶ 36 (Can.) (Concluding lack of
legal supply was unconstitutional because of the government’s removal
of legal access that forced individuals to seek black market purchases of
marijuana).
130

131

See Hitzig v. Canada, [2003] O.J. No. 3873, ¶ 145.

132

Hitzig, [2003] O.J. No. 3873 at ¶ 15- 22.

Id. at ¶ 104-5 (“To take the medication they require they must apply
for an ATP, comply with the detailed requirements of that process, and
then attempt to acquire their medication in the very limited ways
contemplated by the MMAR. These constraints are imposed by the state
as part of the justice system's control of access to marihuana. As such,
they are state actions sufficient to constitute a deprivation of the security
of the person of those who must take marihuana for medical purposes”).

133

2017

A CALL TO HIGHER ACTION

489

essentially granting individuals leave to purchase from
illegal markets.134 While the Court did not view the task to
obtain medical authorization as an impossible or unduly
burdensome task, it did note that, “if in the future physician
co-operation drops to the point that the medical exemption
scheme becomes ineffective, this conclusion might have to be
revisited.” 135 Following this decision, the MMAR was
amended to permit authorized users to obtain marijuana
from Health Canada and the authorization process to obtain
marijuana was further simplified, relaxing the specialist
approval process.136
Indeed, Canada saw an incredible increase in the
number of individuals who were authorized to possess and
produce large amounts of cannabis. The regulation of the
MMAR with respect to the limitations in obtaining licenses
for production as well as the limited amount of cannabis
supply
available
demonstrated
a
necessity
for
137
modification.
Additionally, the amount of production
licenses amplified dramatically, but the issue became a lack
of government foresight because the “MMAR did not intend
to permit such widespread, large-scale marijuana

134

Id. at ¶ 118.

135

Id. at ¶ 139.

136

R. v. Mernagh, [2011] O.J. No. 1669, ¶ 21 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct.).

137

Id. at ¶ 29.
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production;” the government quickly recognized “the
MMAR did not adequately address the public health, safety,
and security concerns that accompanied personal
production.” 138 Numerous local and federal complaints
expressed the negative impacts of personal production inhouse grow operations: various “fire safety risks, building
code violations, electrical violations, diversion, theft, and
children’s safety.” 139 Such worries brought about careful
consideration of amendments, that would address and
improve these issues. The problems with the MMAR were
far from over, and in 2013 Health Canada instituted the
Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulation (MMPR), which
effectively made medical marijuana legal throughout
Canada, 140 thereby replacing the MMAR. 141 Aside from
legalizing medical marijuana to all, the MMPR eliminated
personal production licenses and allowed for-profit
productions facilities.142 This new regime is responsible for
the current explosion of the marijuana industry in Canada,

138

Id. at ¶ 31.

139

Id.

See generally Brian Hutchinson, Medical Marijuana Production in Canada
Set
for
Dramatic
Change,
NAT’L POST,
(Jan
17,
2014),
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/medical-marijuanaproduction-in-canada-set-for-dramatic-change.
140

141

R. v. Mernagh, [2011] O.J. No. 1669, ¶ 31-33 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct.).

142

Id.
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which, in 2014, was estimated to reach an annual industry
accumulation of $1.3 billion by 2024. 143 The MMPR was
short-lived due to several inconsistencies with previous
policies in the MMAR and individual rights under the
Charter. The biggest contention was that the MMPR did not
allow for personal growth of medical cannabis and there
were restrictions for obtaining dry cannabis only.144
3. ACMPR: A JOINT APPROACH BETWEEN MMAR
& MMPR
The expansion of medical marijuana experienced a
significant rise after promulgation of the MMRP, and this
prompted legitimate discussions by parliament on the issue
of recreational legalization. Some even suggest recreational
dialogue is now possible by the Conservative government’s

Id.; see Gecko Research, Why the Canadian Marijuana Sector is the Next
Big Thing and Why Emblem is Our Top Pick, Streetwise Reports, (Dec. 8,
2016), https://www.streetwisereports.com/pub/na/why-the-canadianmarijuana-sector-is-the-next-big-thing-and-why-emblem-is-our-top-pick.
143

See R. v. Smith, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 602, ¶ 34; see also Allard et al. v. Regina,
[2016] F.C. 236 ¶ 254 -7; see Jack Locke & Sam Dabner, Legal Update:
Marihuana for Medical Purpose, FULTON & CO. (Aug 13, 2013),
http://www.fultonco.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Case-LawUpdate-Marihuana-for-Medical-Purposes-1.pdf.
144
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inadvertent expansion of the industry in 2013.145 However,
criticism of the MMRP’s deficiencies positioned another
government stalemate, and pressures from the High Courts
and popular demands suggested a need for a policy
improvement that would incorporate the missing pieces.
With the MMAR and MMPR working concurrently, 146 the
Court in Allard et al. v. Regina concluded both regulations
regarding access, production, and possession of medical
marijuana in conflict with the standards proposed in Section
7. 147 The Federal Court of Canada held that the MMRP’s
limited access for medical marijuana to licensed producers

See Jared Lindzon, With Legalization on the Horizon, Pot Entrepreneurs
are Keen to Turn Canada into a Marijuana Leader, Globe & Mail, (Oct 20, 15)
(“By transitioning from small mom-and-pop operations to the mega
facilities we see today, it is likely that [the Conservative government]
inadvertently created the infrastructure that would greatly benefit from
legalization”),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/small-business/startups/with-legalization-on-the-horizon-potentrepreneurs-are-keen-to-turn-canada-into-a-marijuanaleader/article26890992/.
145

Conron, supra note 5 at 288 (“The MMPR will run concurrently with
the MMAR from the time the new regulations come into force, until
March 31, 2014”).

146

Allard et al. v. Regina, [2016] F.C. 236 ¶ 254-5; see also Andrea Hill,
Allard decision Sets the Stage for the Future of Legal Marijuana, GLOBE &
MAIL, (Feb 25, 2016) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/allarddecision-sets-the-stage-for-the-future-of-legalmarijuana/article28902163/.
147
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only and denying individuals the ability to grow on their
own, infringes individual liberty and security rights.148 Most
concerning to the court was that “under the current
legislation … medical marijuana was not appropriately
affordable and accessible to Canadians.149 Consequently, the
Court’s decision pressured government amendments to the
MMPR and MMAR, and in response the government
announced the enactment of the Access to Cannabis for
Medical Purposes Regulations (“ACMPR”) in 2016. 150
Divided into for parts, the ACMPR permits personal growth
of medical marijuana or to designate a grower, while having
the option to purchase cannabis from licensed producers.151
Essentially, the ACMPR, by replacing the MMAR and
MMPR, consolidates the previous regulations into all four
parts. The framework envisioned in the ACMRP may serve
as a guide for the future
of recreational marijuana
regulation in Canada, and, while the proposal of adult use

148

Allard et al, [2016] F.C. 236 ¶ 289.

Susan Lunn, Philpott won’t Appeal Allard Ruling on Right to Grow
Medical
Marijuana,
CBC
NEWS,
(Mar.
24,
2016)
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/medical-marijuana-grow-allardphilpott-no-appeal-1.3506015.
149

Statement from Health Canada Concerning Access to Cannabis for Medical
Purposes,
HEALTH
CANADA,
(Aug
11,
2016),
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1110389.

150

151

Statement, supra note 151.
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was long-before discussed, the ACMRP and the Allard
decision demonstrate the noteworthy push towards
legalization.152
4. THE TIMES THEY ARE
MAY GO GREEN

A-CHANGIN:

CANADA

The Canadian election of 2015 demonstrated a
monumental transformation in the government’s focus on
marijuana legalization for adult use.153 Liberal Party Leader
and elected Prime Minster Justin Trudeau vowed before and
after the election for a Parliament push towards recreational
legalization. 154 More than half the population supporting
legalization of marijuana in some form. 155 With an immense

152

Lunn, supra note 150.

Jessica Murphy, Justin Trudeau Elected New Canadian Prime Minister as
Liberals
Return
to
Power,
GUARDIAN,
(Oct
20,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/20/justin-trudeau-setto-become-pm-as-liberals-sweep-board-in-canada-election.
153

154

Id.

CBC NEWS, Vote Compass: Majority of Canadians Support Softer Marijuana
Laws,
CBC
NEWS,
(Sep
29,
2015),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-election-2015-marijuana1.3248969.
155
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increase in personal prescription to buy marijuana,156 Prime
Minster Trudeau and a panel of appointed officials are
planning to legitimize the cannabis market and to remove
from the criminal code the possession and consumption of
marijuana. 157 The plan, formalized by the creation of the
Task Force on Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, is led
by Anne McLellan, former deputy Prime Minister, to ensure
a system that will legalize, regulate, and restrict marijuana
access to minors.158 After careful research and investigation
of legal markets in various countries and states in the U.S.,
the Task Force announced at the end of 2016 a 112-page
report outlining Canada’s legal marijuana market, laws, and

Susana Mas, Marijuana Task Force to be Led by Former Deputy PM Anne
McLellan,
CBC
NEW,
(Jun
30,
2016),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberals-marijuana-task-force1.3659509; Jacquie Miller, Numbers of Canadians Buying Legal Medical
Marijuana Triples in Just One Year, OTTAWA CITIZEN, (Dec 12, 2016),
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/number-of-canadiansbuying-legal-medical-marijuana-triples-in-just-one-year.
156

Adam Goldenberg, Is Trudeau’s Plan Constitutional?, POL’Y OPTIONS,
(Nov 18, 2015), http://policyoptions.irpp.org/2015/11/18/trudeau-potconstitution/.
157

Susana Mas, Marijuana Task Force to be Led by Former Deputy PM Anne
McLellan,
CBC
NEWS,
(Jun
30,
2016),
available
at
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberals-marijuana-task-force1.3659509.
158
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regulations. 159 In the report, the task force clarifies that
marijuana will receive more control than government
regulation on tobacco and alcohol in order to prevent access
to minors or to criminal organizations.160 Moreover, the task
force addresses recommendations for minimum age use; it
also provides public safety guidance—especially on
impaired driving—and tighter enforcement in avoiding an
overflow of the legal market into the black market.
While this has allowed for somewhat of a relaxation of
marijuana policy, the government plans on continuing
criminalization on those who access the market without
proper authorization.161 Prime Minister Trudeau has urged
law enforcement to continue seeking those who are getting
ahead of legalization. 162 Trudeau’s promise is official, but
there remains substantial debate on the move towards

Shannon Proudfoot, What Canada Learned About Marijuana,
MACLEAN’S,
(Dec
13,
2016),
http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/what-canada-learned-aboutmarijuana/.
159

160

Id.

Jaime Watt, Justin Trudeau Risks Alienating Both Right and Left, The Star,
(Dec
12,
2016),
https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/12/12/justintrudeau-risks-alienating-both-right-and-left-watt.html.
161

162

Id.
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outright legalization.163 Only time will tell what the outcome
of Canada’s legal market will be, but, given the
government’s history on legalization and regulation of
medical marijuana, Canada may have reached the point of
no return. Perhaps the same can be said about the process in
the U.S.
IV.

PENDING HIGH ISSUES AND BLUNT SOLUTIONS

Currently, cannabis prohibition experiences an
undoubted paradigm shift in the move towards legalization,
regardless of the type of use. Each year, the reception of the
medical or recreational use of cannabis and its
decriminalization in both countries, has seen a growth in
more than half of the population.164In 2016, ArcView Market
Research, including Canada for the first time in the report,
noted the North American “marijuana market posted sales

John Paul Tasker, Pot task force recommends legal cannabis sales be limited
to
users
18
and
over,
CBC
NEWS,
(Dec
13,
2016),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/marijuana-legalization-pot-taskforce-1.3893876; see also Rob Gillies, Justin Trudeau Introduces Bill to
Legalize
Marijuana
in
Canada,
TIME,
(Apr.
13,
2017),
http://time.com/4739145/justin-trudeau-canada-legalize-marijuanapot-2018/.
163

See David Dinenberg, The US is Falling Behind Other Countries—like
Canada—on Marijuana, CNBC, (Apr. 20, 2017),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/20/the-us-falling-behind-othercountries-like-canada-on-marijuana-commentary.html.
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totaling $6.7 billion—a 34% increase from 2015—and
projected the market to increase to $20.2 billion by the year
2021.165 The numbers alone should be an incentive for the
U.S. government to reconsider
the ban vis-à-vis the
166
potential economic benefits. Further, the means of these
nations towards cannabis reform, though differently
managed, create the prospect of elevating the industry from
a national level toward a global industry. However, though
a legalized global economy of cannabis is unlikely to happen
anytime soon, it is imperative that the two nations brace
themselves for the inevitable, and begin cross-border reform
to uniformly address potential future impacts.167

See Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Sales Total $6.7 Billion in 2016, FORBES,
(Jan 1, 2017) (“To put this in perspective, this industry growth is larger
and faster than even the dot-com era. During that time, GDP grew at a
blistering pace of 22%. Thirty percent is an astounding number
especially when you consider that the industry is in early stages.
ArcView’s new editor-in-chief Tom Adams said, "The only consumer
industry categories I've seen reach $5 billion in annual spending and
then post anything like 25% compound annual growth in the next five
years are cable television (19%) in the 1990's and the broadband internet
(29%) in the 2000's’”),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/01/03/marijuanasales-totaled-6-7-billion-in-2016/#1c0352e18716.
166 Id.
165

Yakowicz, supra note 9 (discussing how the United States and Canada
are not the models for legalization as other countries have commence
initiatives towards some-type of legalization, as well as commenting on
167
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A. GREEN AS FAR AS THE EYE CAN SEE
Presently, the legal cannabis market in America
continues to receive a wave of incredible growth, where
sales alone demonstrate a need for the government to
reevaluate their dismissive position. Colorado’s legal market
broke a billion dollars by generating $1.3 billion dollars in
sales in 2016, and within that number $200 million was
generated in tax and licensing alone.168 The first $40 million
of the tax generated from cannabis sales is dedicated to
education and school infrastructure, under an amendment to
the Colorado State Constitution. 169 The remaining funds
from the tax are distributed to programs ranging from drug
prevention to student retention in schools.170 Colorado is one

how other countries have implemented regulation and enforcement
efforts that far surpass the United States model).
See Sean Williams, Canada Aims to Become the First Developed Country to
Legalize Marijuana, Motley Fool, (Apr. 8, 2017),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/04/08/canada-aims-to-becomethe-first-developed-country.aspx.
168

See Choice Organics, Cannabis Revenue Supports Colorado Health,
Education Programs, COLORADOAN, (Apr. 6, 2017),
http://www.coloradoan.com/story/sponsor-story/choiceorganics/2017/04/06/cannabis-revenue-supports-colorado-healtheducation-programs/100122378/.

169

170

Id.
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of many states allocating cannabis funds to the abovementioned programs. Thus, any action from the federal
government to curb state legalization or offer the
implementation of policies that would effectively make the
market unserviceable, will have considerable impact in state
economies and the lives of their citizens.
As an illustrative point, approximately 123,000
Americans are employed in the cannabis industry, and
campaign promises from the current administration
regarding job expansion, would be broken if this job pool
were suddenly lost.171 These are the reported number of jobs
in the current state of the legal market, one could only
imagine the amount of jobs that would sprout as a result of
federal harmonization of laws throughout the country. With
the industry continuing its growth, it is reported the jobs
available would be expected to surpass the growth of
manufacturing jobs by 2020, 172 and most importantly

Alex Halperin, Trump Probably Won’t Crush the Legal Weed Industry,
SLATE, (Mar. 16, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2017/03/trump_p
robably_won_t_crush_legal_weed.html; see also Debra Borchardt,
Marijuana Industry Projected to Create More Jobs Than Manufacturing 2020,
FORBES, (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/02/22/marijuana
-industry-projected-to-create-more-jobs-than-manufacturing-by2020/#74edb89d3fa9.
171

Borchardt, supra note 173; Joe Burgett, New Jobs in Marijuana Industry
to Eclipse New Manufacturing Jobs by 2020, INQUISITOR, (Mar. 13, 2017),
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because cannabis is illegal in most places in the world, these
jobs may be “immune from outsourcing.”173 However, the
industry is in a perpetual state of indecision with conflicting
views within the Trump Administration, while President
Trump is expressly silent on the matter, Attorney General
Sessions unambiguously advocates for tougher reform on
the state experiment and a reawakening to the “Just Say No”
policies against the war on drugs.174 Yet, A.G. Sessions will
have to rethink his focus on state legal cannabis because as
time goes on his fellow Alabamians are reconsidering the
their view on cannabis, where a state poll shows that about
80% of the population believes cannabis should be
legalized.175

http://www.inquisitr.com/opinion/4056246/new-jobs-in-marijuanaindustry-to-eclipse-new-manufacturing-jobs-by-2020/.
173

Halperin, supra note 173.

Sari Horwitz, How Jeff Sessions Wants to Bring Back the War on Drugs,
WASH. POST, (Apr. 8, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-jeffsessions-wants-to-bring-back-the-war-on-drugs/2017/04/08/414ce6be132b-11e7-ada0-1489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.c9af896c8b73
174

Dispensary.com, Most People in Attorney General Jeff Session’s Home
State Want to Legalize Marijuana, Entrepreneur, (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/292657.
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There’s a simple solution here—harmonization—and
it requires bipartisan support that is already in effect. 176
Particularly, a candid discussion about the security of the
industry and the people implicated by it is necessary for the
United States to move forward. The persistent stigmatization
of cannabis ends once government officials beginning
tackling reasonable policies regarding cannabis regulation
and acknowledge the need for this industry to flourish just
as any other legal enterprise. With such haze in the air, many
states are moving to implement policies that would allow
the industry and the citizenry to continue to reap from the
benefits of legal cannabis. Colorado, for example, is
implementing legislation that would allow recreational
cannabis to be reclassified as medical cannabis in case
significant stringent policies are instituted by the federal
government to tackle legal recreational cannabis. 177
However, there would be great financial undercutting if that

Christopher Ingraham, Meet the Senators and Congressmen Who Support
Marijuana Legalization, Wash. Post, (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/09/29/meet
-the-senators-and-congressmen-who-support-marijuanalegalization/?utm_term=.be7e24cf9f2f; Sarah Jacoby, Where Marijuana
Laws Stand in the U.S., Refinery 29, (Apr. 20, 2017),
http://www.refinery29.com/2017/04/149507/marijuana-weedlegalization-trump-sessions.
176

Kristen Wyatt, Colorado Weighs Strategy for Guarding Against Pot
Crackdown, AP NEWS, (Mar. 25, 2017),
https://apnews.com/b5e55ca0d5154397a3a232173c5d7466?utm_campai
gn=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP.
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were to happen, because in Colorado medical cannabis tax is
lower than recreational cannabis tax, which would cut
current funding for education and drug prevention
programs.178 But, this type of state legislative process can be
of great benefit for other similarly situated state to consider
implementing. Such a state reclassification of recreational
cannabis to medical would allow this industry to stay in
business in some form.179 Nevertheless, constantly changing
cannabis policy may be become unstable if the federal
government does not adequately address the issue now.
The significance of this section of the discussion is to
illustrate the steps forward states are taking to ensure the life
of the industry, while the federal government preserve on
keeping the conversation in limbo. The effects of such a
state-federal clash will spill over once Canada becomes the
first G7 nation to legalize cannabis. Canada will be the initial
piece to a global domino effect providing real solutions by
withdrawing focus on cannabis’ criminalization to profiting
on legitimate market for the purposes of “eliminating the
costs . . . of jailing people for selling and possessing pot;
driving out the black market through competition; and
giving people transparency about what they're buying.”180
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The effect created between these two nations would bring
about questions to a potential cross-national cannabis
market, where the commodity is legal in one country, but
only legal in selected locations of the other.
Another noteworthy point is Canada’s willingness to
consult with states like Colorado and Washington to prepare
for legalization; so, it’s time for the U.S. federal government
to discuss with Canada’s Task Force to implement
legislation that would reconcile the industry throughout the
country.181 If not, then the U.S. runs the risk of missing out
on promising market by allowing another country to profit
off American citizens without implementing internal
regulations to deal with that market.182 A dialogue between
Canada and U.S. States, resurrects concerns that resulted in
the failure of the Articles of Confederation, where states
were independent sovereigns able to deal foreign nations.183
Allowing states to conduct dialogue about drug policy with
other nations without federal involvement, decentralizes the
supremacy of the Federal government to regulate such

http://time.com/4728091/canada-legalizing-marijuana-united-statesweed-pot/.
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matters and raises deeper federalism question regarding
state autonomy. Thus, instead of playing with a fail system
of governance, the federal government needs to step up and
lead the conversation of cross-border relations dealing with
cannabis policy.
B. INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS CAUSING CROSS-BORDER
EFFECTS
There are merits in the manner to which the United
States and Canada have moved toward a lawful cannabis
industry, which is inspired by societal concerns regarding
health and crime. Nevertheless, Canada’s move towards full
legalization will conceivably obfuscate its relationship with
the United States, especially when the Trump administration
poses deviating views from the Obama administration
toward cannabis reform. 184 For many, Donald Trump’s

Ingraham, supra note 13; Sharon LaFraniere & Matt Apuzzo, Jeff
Sessions, a Lifelong Outsider, Finds the Inside Track, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan 8, 2016)
(After one of the most liberal periods in Justice Department history, Mr.
Sessions is expected to execute an about-face on the Obama
administration’s policies of immigration, criminal justice and — many
critics fear — civil rights),
http://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/01/08/us/politics/jeff-sessionsattorney-general.html?WT.nav=topnews&action=click&amp=&amp=&amp=&amp=&amp=&amp=&clickS
ource=story-heading&emc=edit_nn_20170109&hp=&module=firstcolumn-region&nl=morning184
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campaign and election was unexpected, and advocates of
cannabis reform raise similar concerns about the trajectory of
the cannabis industry in the United States. 185 The
appointment of Senator Jeff Sessions and several other
cabinet members leaves the accomplishments of the
outgoing liberal government in a state of possible regress.186
As unlikely as it may be for Senator Sessions and the Trump
administration to dismantle existing state laws on both
medical and recreational use, as the aforementioned DOJ
memorandums illustrate, there is wide latitude for the
government to commence more rigid enforcement and
regulatory policies. 187 Any prospect of cannabis reform in
either acknowledging individual rights, as charted in
Canada, and the federalism conflict, seem grim with a
republican majority government. Though state literature

briefing&nlid=72254056&pgtype=Homepage&region=topnews&te=1&referer=.
Dan Roberts, et al., Donald Trump’s win Presidential election, plunging
US into Uncertain Future, GUARDIAN, (Nov 9, 2016)
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/09/donald-trumpwins-us-election-news; McGreevy, supra note 102.
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acknowledges a right to access for medical cannabis,
developing such a right has yet to be undertaken by the
federal government, and perhaps will not be a consideration
of the Trump administration.188
But what does this mean for the American-Canadian
relationship? Well, for starters, with such a vehement view
of cannabis reform, as noted by most in the Trump
administration, there may be a wave to promote draconian
regulations regarding border patrol and immigration.
However, a few countries are commencing some type of
internal drug policy and are examining how to deal with
major international treaties—initiated by the American effort
against the war on drugs.189 Canada may receive immense
support from nations, such as Great Britain, Germany, and
Israel, to ameliorate global drug policy, which may cause the

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). (“For now, federal law is blind to
the wisdom of a future day when the right to use medical marijuana to
alleviate excruciating pain may be deemed fundamental. Although that
day has not yet dawned, considering that during the last ten years eleven
states have legalized the use of medical marijuana, that day may be upon
us sooner than expected. Until that day arrives, federal law does not
recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a
licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering”).
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United States to align with countries that have taken extreme
measures to combat the war on drugs.190 Both countries are
the key players of the Western hemisphere, and are
responsible for creating decisive solutions to current global
issues. Thus, it is not conducive to continue this cat-fight
against legalization. An unsettling approach may ruin the
prospect of regulating a legitimate market, and perhaps
providing further aliments for people to resort to illicit
channels.
The extensive border between the United States and
Canada includes states that have legalized marijuana either
for adult or medical use, but other states may not move for
legalization at all. Cross-border inconsistencies on the
legality of cannabis present immediate problems to Canada’s
plan to legalize because the Trump administration
commented that the government firmly intends to keep
cannabis illegal at the federal level.191 Leaving the states to
vet for themselves in dealing with border patrol issues may
force states that have legalized cannabis to consider heavier
restrictions along the border.192 Presently, the United States’
border policies result in travel bans to immigrants admitting
to using marijuana, which is an issue Canada has pleaded
with the American government to fix because of the ban’s
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effect on Canadians.193 Because the border patrol is under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government,
cannabis at the border is illegal on the side of the free nation
and policy can change at any moment.194
The above presents a concern in acquiring American
legal representation for Canadians and Americans who have
been criminalized for possession. Because some state rules of
professional responsibility strictly adhere to federal laws,
such as the CSA, this may create an opportunity of ethical
infractions for attorneys. 195 Limitations of legal access in

Andrew Blake, Canada to urge U.S. for Changes to Border Law that Bans
Marijuana Smokers from Entry, WASH. TIMES, (Sep 10, 2016),
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Canada are not at all prevalent; instead Canada witnesses a
surge of individuals in need of legal assistance when
admitting to their use of marijuana to American border
patrol agents. 196 This results in impossible immigration
battles between the two nations, and requires keen dialogue
to solve the issue. There is great uncertainty as to how the
Trump Administration will decide to deal with this, but, for
now, it calls for such individuals to keep an open mind
towards co-operative management between the two nations.
Moreover, Canadian prospects of legalization commenced a
new wave of American citizens making their way to the
greater north, which potentially calls for “building a wall in
order to keep Americans in” the U.S.197 Many Americans are
seeking work permits for various occupations in Canada
because the booming industry has amplified job creation
and, at the rate Canada is heading, Americans will continue
to seek jobs in Canada that are not available throughout the
U.S.198
C. DISREGARD FOR THE JUDICIARY? — F.A.A.
KEEPING CANNABIS CONTRACTS ALIVE
Businesses in states where cannabis is legal in some
form, are facing an additional concern: can cannabis related
contracts be enforceable? The unclean hands doctrine
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provides a route to find a contract unenforceable because of
an illegality embedded in the agreement.199 This is a path
many courts are taking when dealing with cannabis related
disputes, thereby leaving parties without a remedy.200 As a
result, the Cannabis Dispute Resolution Institute
acknowledging this unfairness, is providing a forum for
cannabis related disputes so that cannabis businesses can
seek redress when necessary.201 However, this process, while
providing a service to these disputes, incentivizes a
disservice by disregarding policies the judiciary are bound
to and opening a back-door approach to have cannabis
contracts enforced. For years, arbitration is regarded as an
efficient manner to solve disputes privately and decided by
experts in the field to make parties more comfortable with

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981);
see also, Steven Mare, He Who Comes into Court Must Not Come with Green
Hands: The Marijuana Industry’s Ongoing Struggle with the Illegality and
Unclean Hands Doctrines, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1351, 1359 (2016).
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the award rendered. 202 While there is no question to the
enforceability and constitutionality of arbitral awards, as
decided by the Supreme Court, allowing for cannabis
contract disputes to be decided in this manner will leave a
void in case-law for the future.203 Giving leave to arbitration
tribunals to decide such disputes, and having the awards
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act 204 ,
circumvents the decisions made by the judiciary when
applying the unclean hands doctrine to illegal contracts.
Encouraging cannabis business to implement
arbitration clauses in their agreements offers some-what of a
disregard for the judicial system. Nevertheless, these
tribunals should be used as a supplement or in conjunction
with the traditional judicial process, but the tribunals should
not be the only way to seek enforcement. More
inconsistencies in law regarding cannabis business would
arise following the above, as a result, it should be a
government priority to balance these approaches by
considering uniform cannabis policy through the U.S. or
rescheduling cannabis under the CSA. With the emerging
legal market in Cannabis it may be foreseeable that
Canadian marijuana enterprises utilize arbitration
agreements with American companies to have their
contracts enforced. Such a novel situation would give rise to
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new questions about the enforceability and recognition of
awards under the New York Convention, which is beyond
the scope of this Note.205
D. TREATIES
American’s uncertain future on cannabis reform may
pose significant barriers to Canadian efforts on full
legalization. Because both countries are signatories to three
major UN treaties regarding global drug policy, there may
be pressures from the Trump Administration to sanction or
hold Canada liable for treaty violations.206 This would not be
the first time the United States would make an attempt at
this.207 During the Bush Administration, the known “drug
czar” John Walters denounced Canadian efforts to
decriminalize cannabis and the liberalization of drug
policies.208 Believing that “poison” would flow south of the
Canadian border, Walters threatened the Canadian
government with stricter border patrol and moving to hold

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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Canada liable for treaty violations.209 This pressure ended up
being effective, causing the Canadian government to back
off from cannabis reform for nearly a decade.210 A similar
situation may present itself in the near future, given that the
two nations are in a similar political states similar to those
during the time of the Bush and Chrétien governments.211
Either country may face serious backlash depending on how
the global community reacts to Canada’s cannabis policy
reform. Thus, for Canada to avoid this backlash, the
government must denounce the above treaties and then
must attempt to reapply to the treaties with expressed
reservations. 212 Though this approach will take time, this
may be a remedial way to avoid conflict between the two
nations.
V.

CONCLUSION

Though the popularity of cannabis is nothing recent, its
progression towards a legitimate market demonstrates a
colossal transformation in the perception on the war on
drugs. The potential legalization of cannabis in Canada puts
the country ahead of other developed nations in tackling
drug policy. The drug ban has only led to immense political,
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social, and economic issues, which require frank discussions
between adult leaders. One of the many lessons the United
States can learn from its neighbor, is Canada’s concern for
individual security rights under federal law. Drug reform
should not be about the criminalization and alienation of
people, as the history of cannabis has indicated. Instead,
comprehensive reform comes through sincere approaches
solving pervasive issues regarding citizen quotidian matters.
When there is no government acknowledgment of the basic
rights that the laws afford, then there will be a heightened
focus on government prerogatives to regulate and
criminalize, rather than reconsiderations of how governance
interferes with basic citizen livelihood. The purpose of this
note is to demonstrate how swiftly it is for federal inaction
and reaction to create national filibusters that do not allow
for fruitful measures that would fix problems affecting the
overall functionality of the government. This Note intends to
create spaces for discussion on matters that we have
consistently ignored. While this Note does not discuss the
racial and discriminatory consequences of existing drug
policies, it does implore the reader to acknowledge and
evaluate these issues tainting the innocent lives of many. The
successes of the legalization experiment in both Canada and
some U.S. states, should be evidence to the American
government of the need to harmonize the application of laws
regarding legal cannabis, in order to avoid unknown
consequences in the future.

